Credibility of incentive equilibrium strategies in linear-state differential games

DOI10.1007/s10957-005-4722-2zbMath1101.91012OpenAlexW2018020262MaRDI QIDQ852115

Georges Zaccour, Guiomar Martín-Herrán

Publication date: 27 November 2006

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-005-4722-2

zbMATH Keywords

credibilitycooperationenvironmental economicsincentive equilibrialinear-state differential gamesknowledge accumulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games and control (49N70) Cooperative games (91A12) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (12)

Incentive equilibrium strategies in dynamic games played over event trees ⋮ The Leitmann-Schmitendorf advertising differential game ⋮ Sustainability of Cooperation in Dynamic Games Played over Event Trees ⋮ Strong time-consistent core for a class of linear-state games ⋮ Stackelberg solutions of differential games in the class of nonanticipative strategies ⋮ Non-linear Incentive Equilibrium Strategies for a Transboundary Pollution Differential Game ⋮ Incentive equilibrium in an overlapping-generations environmental game ⋮ Pareto improvements of Nash equilibria in differential games ⋮ Employee-stock-options, production/service functions and game theory ⋮ Adjustment of an affine contract with a fixed-point iteration ⋮ Credible Linear-Incentive Equilibrium Strategies in Linear-Quadratic Differential Games ⋮ Does flexibility facilitate sustainability of cooperation over time? A case study from environmental economics

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