Testable implications of Pareto efficiency and individualrationality

DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0026-xzbMath1120.91023OpenAlexW2020032971MaRDI QIDQ852311

Ruediger Bachmann

Publication date: 29 November 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0026-x

zbMATH Keywords

Quantifier eliminationAllocation datanon-parametric restrictions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Testable implications of the core in TU market games, Testable implications of coalitional rationality, Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games, Testable implications of general equilibrium models: an integer programming approach, Testing Pareto efficiency and competitive equilibrium in economies with public goods, The testable implications of competitive equilibrium in economies with externalities

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