Fending off one means fending off all: evolutionary stability in quasi-submodular aggregative games
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Publication:852312
DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0027-9zbMath1120.91005OpenAlexW2093186161MaRDI QIDQ852312
Publication date: 29 November 2006
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0027-9
Related Items
Evolutionary games and matching rules, Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation, Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games, Robust stochastic stability, Asymmetric oligopoly and evolutionary stability
Cites Work
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- The evolution of Walrasian behavior in oligopolies
- The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
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- Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
