Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result

DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0039-5zbMath1117.91027OpenAlexW2114335048MaRDI QIDQ852319

Frank Riedel, Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Publication date: 29 November 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0039-5

zbMATH Keywords

Game theoryWeak dominanceMulti-unit auctionsSimultaneous ascending-bid auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Auctions for social lending: a theoretical analysis

Cites Work

• Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
• Perfect equilibria in simultaneous-offers bargaining
• Auctions of Shares
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Escaping Nash Inflation
• Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply

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