The private value single item bisection auction

DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0032-zzbMath1119.91038OpenAlexW2013405413MaRDI QIDQ852323

N. E. Zubov

Publication date: 29 November 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/5c973ca6-c1bb-41e5-afff-b6d300f2f88c

zbMATH Keywords

information revelationEnglish auctionbinary searchbisection auctionextensive form games of incomplete informationsingle item auctionVickrey auctionweakly dominant strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

The communication cost of selfishness ⋮ Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Two-Sided Markets ⋮ A speedy auction using approximated bidders' preferences ⋮ Fraction auctions: the tradeoff between efficiency and running time ⋮ Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions ⋮ On the fastest Vickrey algorithm ⋮ Asking questions ⋮ Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication ⋮ On communication protocols that compute almost privately ⋮ Dynamic communication mechanism design

Cites Work

• Auction design with costly preference elicitation
• Incentives in Teams
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