Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
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Publication:852326
DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0040-ZzbMath1120.91019OpenAlexW2163031017MaRDI QIDQ852326
Bernard Salanié, François Salanié, Bruno Jullien
Publication date: 29 November 2006
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/1345/1/salanie_jullien.pdf
Related Items (15)
The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent ⋮ Screening teams of moral and altruistic agents ⋮ Competitive screening in insurance markets with endogenous wealth heterogeneity ⋮ Optimizing a single-product production-inventory system under constant absolute risk aversion ⋮ Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions ⋮ Robust incentives for risk ⋮ Ross risk vulnerability for introductions and changes in background risk ⋮ Risk-incentives trade-off and outside options ⋮ On the positive correlation property in competitive insurance markets ⋮ The Annuity Puzzle and an Outline of Its Solution ⋮ Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models ⋮ Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection ⋮ Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection ⋮ Adverse selection, moral hazard and propitious selection ⋮ On Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information
Cites Work
- Self-insurance, self-protection and increased risk aversion
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Regulation of a risk averse firm
- Risk aversion and self-insurance-cum-protection
- Monopoly insurance under adverse selection when agents differ in risk aversion
- Optimal contracting of separable production technologies
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Comparative mixed risk aversion: Definition and application to self-protection and willingness to pay
- Choosing Between Risky Prospects: The Characterization of Comparative Statics Results, and Location Independent Risk
- Some Stronger Measures of Risk Aversion in the Small and the Large with Applications
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