Social norms, cooperation and inequality

DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0045-7zbMath1120.91003OpenAlexW1541045608MaRDI QIDQ852333

Pedro Dal Bó

Publication date: 29 November 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp802.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

discriminationfolk theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (8)

A theory of perceived discrimination ⋮ Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play ⋮ Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints ⋮ Efficiency may improve when defectors exist ⋮ Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence ⋮ An experimental investigation of a third-person enforcement in a prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games ⋮ Long-term relationships as safeguards

Cites Work

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• Social norms and random matching games
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• Sequential Equilibria
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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