Social norms, cooperation and inequality
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Publication:852333
DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0045-7zbMath1120.91003OpenAlexW1541045608MaRDI QIDQ852333
Publication date: 29 November 2006
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp802.pdf
Related Items (8)
A theory of perceived discrimination ⋮ Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play ⋮ Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints ⋮ Efficiency may improve when defectors exist ⋮ Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence ⋮ An experimental investigation of a third-person enforcement in a prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games ⋮ Long-term relationships as safeguards
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- Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
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- Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
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