Scoring rules: an alternative parameterization

DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0049-3zbMath1117.91022OpenAlexW2053346826MaRDI QIDQ852338

Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan

Publication date: 29 November 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0049-3

zbMATH Keywords

Minimal size of veto coalitionParameterizationScore-expansion propertyScoring rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

The costs of implementing the majority principle: The golden voting rule ⋮ Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies ⋮ Symmetric and asymmetric committees

Cites Work

• The Borda dictionary
• A characterization result for the plurality rule
• The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization
• A simple characterization of plurality rule

This page was built for publication: Scoring rules: an alternative parameterization