Using an iterated prisoner's dilemma with exit option to study alliance behavior: results of a tournament and simulation

DOI10.1007/s10588-005-5589-3zbMath1137.91311OpenAlexW2019767601MaRDI QIDQ853666

Darryl A. Seale, Richard J. Arend, Steven E. Phelan

Publication date: 17 November 2006

Published in: Computational \& Mathematical Organization Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10588-005-5589-3

zbMATH Keywords

game theorytournamentstrategic alliancesopportunism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (2)

Stability analysis of R\&D cooperation in a supply chain ⋮ Evolution of cooperation through aspiration-based adjustment of interaction range in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• When Competition Eclipses Cooperation: An Event History Analysis of Joint Venture Failure
• Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm

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