Public trust and government betrayal

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.003zbMath1141.91661OpenAlexW2000685927MaRDI QIDQ854929

Christopher Phelan

Publication date: 7 December 2006

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.003

zbMATH Keywords

government reputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Related Items (22)

Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships ⋮ Citizens' trust in government and their willingness-to-pay ⋮ Reputation building through costly adjustment ⋮ Limited records and reputation bubbles ⋮ Optimal policy with credibility concerns ⋮ Crying about a strategic wolf: a theory of crime and warning ⋮ Impermanent types and permanent reputations ⋮ Reputation Effects ⋮ Bounded memory and incomplete information ⋮ Crisis contracts ⋮ Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection ⋮ Sustainable reputations with rating systems ⋮ Reputation and impermanent types ⋮ Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover ⋮ Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes ⋮ Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games ⋮ Occurrence of Deception Under the Oversight of a Regulator Having Reputation Concerns ⋮ Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information—The Limit Case ⋮ Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information ⋮ The political (in)stability of funded social security ⋮ A Model of Multiproduct Firm Growth ⋮ Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games

Cites Work

• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Reputation in dynamic games
• Repeated Bargaining with Persistent Private Information
• Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
• Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
• Who Wants a Good Reputation?

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