Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.003zbMath1141.91388OpenAlexW3124053878MaRDI QIDQ854935

S. Nageeb M. Ali

Publication date: 7 December 2006

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

delayoptimismmultilateral bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Optimal stalling when bargaining ⋮ Collective hold‐up ⋮ Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining ⋮ Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining ⋮ Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members ⋮ Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Waiting to Persuade
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem

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