Joint production in teams

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.005zbMath1141.91573OpenAlexW3121878445MaRDI QIDQ854936

Marco Battaglini

Publication date: 7 December 2006

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.005

zbMATH Keywords

contract theorytheory of the firmincentivesteamsmoral Hazard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items

Combinatorial agency, Mechanism design with a restricted action space, How to share it out: the value of information in teams

Cites Work

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