Joint production in teams
From MaRDI portal
Publication:854936
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.005zbMath1141.91573OpenAlexW3121878445MaRDI QIDQ854936
Publication date: 7 December 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.005
Related Items
Combinatorial agency, Mechanism design with a restricted action space, How to share it out: the value of information in teams
Cites Work
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