On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.04.007zbMath1141.91391OpenAlexW3124336837MaRDI QIDQ854939

Alessandro Pavan, Giacomo Calzolari

Publication date: 7 December 2006

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.163.8799

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcontractual and informational externalitiesexogenous and endogenous private informationoptimal disclosure policiessequential common agency games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (25)

Stress tests and information disclosure ⋮ Information sharing between vertical hierarchies ⋮ Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning ⋮ Consumers' privacy choices in the era of big data ⋮ Community repeated interaction and strategic delegation ⋮ Privacy-constrained network formation ⋮ Slow persuasion ⋮ Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences ⋮ Screening with privacy on (im)persistency ⋮ Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design ⋮ Optimal auction design under non-commitment ⋮ Sequential information disclosure in auctions ⋮ On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations ⋮ Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition ⋮ The economics of data externalities ⋮ Transparency of outside options in bargaining ⋮ Vagueness and information-sharing ⋮ Information design in competitive insurance markets ⋮ Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization ⋮ Perception games and privacy ⋮ Test design under voluntary participation ⋮ The role of the agent's outside options in principal-agent relationships ⋮ Sequential contracting with multiple principals ⋮ Privacy, patience, and protection ⋮ Selling privacy at auction

Cites Work

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• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• Contracting with Externalities
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
• Optimal Auction with Resale

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