Internet auctions with many traders
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Publication:854942
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.005zbMath1141.91402OpenAlexW3124772755MaRDI QIDQ854942
Michael Peters, Sergei Severinov
Publication date: 7 December 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/UT-ECIPA-PETERS-01-01.pdf
Related Items (19)
Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand ⋮ An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem ⋮ Frictions in Internet auctions with many traders: a counterexample ⋮ An empirical investigation of efficiency and price uniformity in competing auctions ⋮ Defensive sniping and efficiency in simultaneous hard-close proxy auctions ⋮ Networks, frictions, and price dispersion ⋮ Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate ⋮ Multiple and last-minute bidding in competing internet auctions ⋮ Competing auctions with endogenous quantities ⋮ An ascending double auction ⋮ First price package auction with many traders ⋮ Auctions with a buy price ⋮ Competition in online markets with auctions and posted prices ⋮ Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice ⋮ Imperfect competition in online auctions ⋮ The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap ⋮ Optimal Inventory Control and Allocation for Sequential Internet Auctions ⋮ Posted price selling and online auctions ⋮ Simultaneous independent online auctions with discrete bid increments
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
- Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
- The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
- Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
- A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
- Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1
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