Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.05.008zbMath1141.91394OpenAlexW3124614771MaRDI QIDQ855314

Harrison H. C. Cheng

Publication date: 7 December 2006

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.05.008

zbMATH Keywords

revenue rankinglinear bidding modellumber auctionsopen and sealed-bid auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (16)

On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case ⋮ Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch ⋮ Ranking asymmetric auctions ⋮ Separating equilibria in auctions with two types of bidders ⋮ Asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Competitive bidding in asymmetric multidimensional public procurement ⋮ Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction ⋮ Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions ⋮ Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions ⋮ A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders ⋮ Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction ⋮ Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations ⋮ Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism ⋮ Numerical Solution of Asymmetric Auctions

Cites Work

• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions

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