Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems
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Publication:855361
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2005.12.002zbMath1201.91058OpenAlexW2017852563MaRDI QIDQ855361
Publication date: 7 December 2006
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2005.12.002
Related Items (7)
Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice ⋮ Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules ⋮ Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem ⋮ An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems ⋮ A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives ⋮ Collective Choice for Simple Preferences ⋮ Consistency and its converse: an introduction
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