Uniqueness conditions for strongly point-rationalizable solutions to games with metrizable strategy sets

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2006.01.001zbMath1142.91015OpenAlexW2071933652MaRDI QIDQ855370

Alexander Zimper

Publication date: 7 December 2006

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.01.001

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumfixed point theoremsCournot competitioniterative solution conceptspoint-rationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (2)

Rationalizability in general situations ⋮ Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes

Cites Work

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• Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
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• Choquet rationality
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• Pure Strategy Dominance
• Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
• On Type 2 Semi-Algebras of Continuous Functions

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