Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2005.08.009zbMath1142.91326OpenAlexW2062463367MaRDI QIDQ855374

Chen-Ying Huang, Tomas Sjöström

Publication date: 7 December 2006

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/186444/1/03.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

consistencycooperative game theorypartition function form gamesnon-cooperative implementationrecursive core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (8)

The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games ⋮ Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities ⋮ Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core ⋮ The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Solving coalitional resource games ⋮ Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities ⋮ The recursive core for non-superadditive games

Cites Work

• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Reduced games, consistency, and the core
• A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Non-cooperative implementation of the core
• Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
• Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation
• Order independent equilibria
• Credible coalitions and the core
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining

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