Vote trading in public elections

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.004zbMath1141.91372OpenAlexW1981436672MaRDI QIDQ855754

David B. Hartvigsen

Publication date: 7 December 2006

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

integer programmingknapsack problemvoting strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Integer programming (90C10) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items

On avoiding vote swapping ⋮ Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures ⋮ Gerrymander-proof representative democracies ⋮ Voces populi and the art of listening ⋮ Vote trading and subset sums

Cites Work

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