A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.003zbMath1141.91316OpenAlexW2028612444WikidataQ56767858 ScholiaQ56767858MaRDI QIDQ855757

Issofa Moyouwou, Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga

Publication date: 7 December 2006

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.003

zbMATH Keywords

stability setweak ordersfundamental cyclesvoting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (3)

Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction ⋮ A core of voting games with improved foresight ⋮ SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS

Cites Work

• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
• A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set

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