A new weight scheme for the Shapley value

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2006.03.001zbMath1141.91322OpenAlexW2163967519MaRDI QIDQ855759

Guillaume Haeringer

Publication date: 7 December 2006

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.001

zbMATH Keywords

weightsmonotonicityShapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (13)

ALLOCATION OF FIXED COSTS: CHARACTERIZATION OF THE (DUAL) WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUE ⋮ A solution concept for network games: the role of multilateral interactions ⋮ On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values ⋮ The proportional Shapley value and applications ⋮ Power surplus solutions for weighted hypergraph communication situations ⋮ The optimal product pricing and carbon emissions reduction profit allocation of CET-covered enterprises in the cooperative supply chain ⋮ The class of ASN-position values. Centrality and consequences of connection failure ⋮ A value for communication situations with players having different bargaining abilities ⋮ A new look at the role of players' weights in the weighted Shapley value ⋮ The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions ⋮ An axiomatic characterization of the position value for network situations ⋮ The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure ⋮ An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On weighted Shapley values
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game

This page was built for publication: A new weight scheme for the Shapley value