Location of terror response facilities: a game between state and terrorist
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Publication:856300
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2005.12.022zbMath1110.90063OpenAlexW2059829651MaRDI QIDQ856300
Publication date: 7 December 2006
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2005.12.022
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