Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games
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Publication:857564
DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0031-8zbMath1154.91313OpenAlexW2114992488MaRDI QIDQ857564
Publication date: 19 December 2006
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0031-8
Related Items (3)
Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games ⋮ Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction ⋮ Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games
Cites Work
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