Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0032-7zbMath1154.91310OpenAlexW2067176125MaRDI QIDQ857566

Michihiro Kandori, Ichiro Obara

Publication date: 19 December 2006

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/people/papers/Obara/Obara275.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

EfficiencyPrisoners' dilemmaRepeated gamesFolk theoremGarblingImperfect public monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring ⋮ Sustainable reputations with rating systems ⋮ Information can wreck cooperation: a counterpoint to Kandori (1992) ⋮ Comparison of Information Structures for Zero-Sum Games and a Partial Converse to Blackwell Ordering in Standard Borel Spaces ⋮ Plausible cooperation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Moral hazard and private monitoring
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Internal correlation in repeated games
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies

This page was built for publication: Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games