All-pay auctions with risk-averse players

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0034-5zbMath1154.91411OpenAlexW2117339108MaRDI QIDQ857568

Gadi Fibich, Aner Sela, Arieh Gavious

Publication date: 19 December 2006

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0034-5

zbMATH Keywords

Risk aversionPerturbation analysisPrivate-value auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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