How does separability affect the desirability of referendum election outcomes?

DOI10.1007/s11238-006-9001-7zbMath1101.91320OpenAlexW2087548478MaRDI QIDQ857660

Jonathan K. Hodge, Peter Schwallier

Publication date: 20 December 2006

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-9001-7

zbMATH Keywords

computer simulationpreference interdependencevoting paradoxesreferendum electionsseparable preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items (7)

Single-peaked preferences over multidimensional binary alternatives ⋮ Preseparable extensions of multidimensional preferences ⋮ Classifying interdependence in multidimensional binary preferences ⋮ Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum ⋮ The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections ⋮ Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will? ⋮ When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?

Cites Work

• The paradox of multiple elections
• Separable discrete preferences
• Permutations of separable preference orders
• The Mathematics of Voting and Elections: A Hands-On Approach

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