Simulating the effect of nepotism on political risk taking and social unrest

DOI10.1007/S10588-006-9008-1zbMATH Open1101.91357OpenAlexW2006062777MaRDI QIDQ857729

Lawrence A. Kuznar, William G. Frederick

Publication date: 20 December 2006

Published in: Computational \& Mathematical Organization Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10588-006-9008-1

zbMATH Keywords

InequalityTerrorismAgent-based modelingNepotismRisk sensitivitySocial unrest

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

• Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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