Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games

DOI10.1007/S00186-006-0100-6zbMath1149.91015OpenAlexW2078814866MaRDI QIDQ857827

Yan-An Hwang

Publication date: 5 January 2007

Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-006-0100-6

zbMATH Keywords

coreNTU gamesconsistent egalitarian solutionreduced game property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (3)

Sequentially two-leveled egalitarianism for TU games: characterization and application ⋮ The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games ⋮ Fuzzy games: a characterization of the core

Cites Work

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• Excess Functions for Cooperative Games without Sidepayments
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel, the Core, and NTU Bankruptcy Problems

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