Candidate stability and voting correspondences
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Publication:857970
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0126-yzbMath1142.91429OpenAlexW2130399840MaRDI QIDQ857970
Publication date: 5 January 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1523/1/WRAP_Rodriguez_Alvarez_twerp666.pdf
Related Items (3)
Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship ⋮ An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit ⋮ A unifying impossibility theorem
Cites Work
- Candidate stability and probabilistic voting procedures
- Some further results on nonbinary social choice
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice
- A trade-off result for preference revelation
- Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy
- Stability and voting by committees with exit
- Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
- A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
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