Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0140-0zbMath1142.91427OpenAlexW4213413545MaRDI QIDQ857972

Bezalel Peleg, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 5 January 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp308.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (2)

Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered ⋮ Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions

Cites Work

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• Equally distributed correspondences
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Consistent Voting Systems
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• The Marriage Problem

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