Endogenous voting agendas

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0143-xzbMath1142.91423OpenAlexW2034002335MaRDI QIDQ857975

John Duggan

Publication date: 5 January 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0143-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (3)

DECIDING WHEN TO DECIDE: COLLECTIVE DELIBERATION AND OBSTRUCTION ⋮ Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members ⋮ The spatial model with non-policy factors: a theory of policy-motivated candidates

Cites Work

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• Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees
• On the core of voting games
• Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• The generic existence of a core for \(q\)-rules
• Equilibrium agenda formation
• Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
• Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
• Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games
• Generic Instability of Majority Rule
• Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information

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