A simple characterization of approval voting

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0145-8zbMath1142.91420OpenAlexW2060147086MaRDI QIDQ857977

Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Publication date: 5 January 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0145-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items

Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting ⋮ Qualified voting systems ⋮ Variable-population voting rules ⋮ Two field experiments on approval voting in Germany ⋮ Infinite-population approval voting: a proposal ⋮ The maximin support method: an extension of the d'Hondt method to approval-based multiwinner elections ⋮ Approval-based apportionment ⋮ Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting ⋮ Formal utilitarianism and range voting ⋮ Weighted approval voting ⋮ Dis\&approval voting: a characterization ⋮ A characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives ⋮ Majority rule on \(j\)-rich ballot spaces ⋮ Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences ⋮ Size approval voting ⋮ Collective Choice for Simple Preferences ⋮ Axiomatizations of Approval Voting ⋮ Approval Voting in Germany: Description of a Field Experiment ⋮ Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations ⋮ Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem

Cites Work

• A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate
• Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
• Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. I: Pairwise votes
• Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. II: Positional voting
• Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting