Rational choice and von Neumann-Morgenstern's stable set: The case of path-dependent procedures

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0147-6zbMath1142.91431OpenAlexW2100958488MaRDI QIDQ857979

Taradas Bandyopadhyay, Kunal Sengupta

Publication date: 5 January 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0147-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

A characterization of path dependent modes of behavior

Cites Work

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• Revealed preference and the axiomatic foundations of intransitive indifference: The case of asymmetric subrelations
• On the routewise application of choice
• The congruence axiom and path independence
• Revealed Preference Theory, Ordering and the Axiom of Sequential Path Independence
• Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
• Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
• Ordinal Preference and Rational Choice
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions

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