Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.008zbMath1154.91382OpenAlexW2109916177MaRDI QIDQ859595

Bo Larsson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Publication date: 16 January 2007

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.008

zbMATH Keywords

Gibbard-Satterthwaite theoremBarberà-Sonnenschein-Zhou theoremstrategy-proof voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (16)

Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference ⋮ Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice ⋮ Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped ⋮ A note on binary strategy-proof social choice functions ⋮ Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results ⋮ Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives ⋮ Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness ⋮ Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains ⋮ Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences ⋮ On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives ⋮ Upper set rules with binary ranges ⋮ An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains ⋮ Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice ⋮ The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions ⋮ Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models ⋮ A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Queue allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• Arrow and Gibbard--Satterthwaite revisited. Extended domains and shorter proofs
• Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
• Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
• Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade
• Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
• Voting by Committees
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange

This page was built for publication: Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain