A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel
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Publication:859597
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.07.004zbMath1154.91326OpenAlexW2038769998MaRDI QIDQ859597
Ken-Ichi Shimomura, Roberto Serrano
Publication date: 16 January 2007
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/355
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
- On the reduced game property and its converse
- A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
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- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
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- The kernel of a cooperative game
- The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel, the Core, and NTU Bankruptcy Problems
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
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