Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.03.007zbMath1153.91404OpenAlexW2069755374MaRDI QIDQ859603

M. Carmen Sánchez, Josep E. Peris

Publication date: 16 January 2007

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.03.007

zbMATH Keywords

social choicehierarchyveto powerdictatoroligarchyfixed agenda

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

A foundation for Pareto optimality ⋮ Collective choice rules with social maximality

Cites Work

• Hierarchical voting
• Fixed agenda social choice theory: Correspondence and impossibility theorems for social choice correspondences and social decision functions
• Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: the fixed agenda framework
• Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
• Axioms for Lexicographic Preferences
• Social Decision Functions and the Veto

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