Control and voting power in corporate networks: Concepts and computational aspects

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2006.02.020zbMath1163.90395OpenAlexW1977013508MaRDI QIDQ859701

Luc Leruth, Yves Cramer

Publication date: 16 January 2007

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/1728

zbMATH Keywords

game theorysimulationfinancepower indicescorporate networks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Communication networks in operations research (90B18) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (13)

Implicit power indices for measuring indirect control in corporate structures ⋮ Effectivity and power ⋮ Improving polynomial estimation of the Shapley value by stratified random sampling with optimum allocation ⋮ Higher order assortativity in complex networks ⋮ The Banzhaf index in complete and incomplete shareholding structures: a new algorithm ⋮ Indirect Control of Corporations: Analysis and Simulations ⋮ Cross-ownership and portfolio choice ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Indirect control and power in mutual control structures ⋮ Power Indices in Spanning Connectivity Games ⋮ Applying relation algebra and RelView to measures in a social network ⋮ Set-weighted games and their application to the cover problem ⋮ POWER INDICES AND THE MEASUREMENT OF CONTROL IN CORPORATE STRUCTURES

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• Values of Large Games, I: A Limit Theorem
• Characterization of the Banzhaf–Coleman Index
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Block Investment and Partial Benefits of Corporate Control

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