\(p\)-best response set

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.001zbMath1142.91345OpenAlexW1596300998MaRDI QIDQ860346

Olivier Tercieux

Publication date: 9 January 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.001

zbMATH Keywords

risk-dominance\(p\)-dominancehigher-order uncertaintyperfect foresight dynamicsset-valued concept

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (15)

Nash blocks ⋮ The cutting power of preparation ⋮ On the relationship between \(p\)-dominance and stochastic stability in network games ⋮ A characterization of stochastically stable networks ⋮ Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection ⋮ Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games ⋮ Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection ⋮ Iterated elimination procedures ⋮ Adaptive learning and \(p\)-best response sets ⋮ Perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives and time symmetry ⋮ Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in \(N\)-player games ⋮ Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria ⋮ Epistemically robust strategy subsets ⋮ \(p\)-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information

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