Menu theorems for bilateral contracting

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.002zbMath1142.91483OpenAlexW2136700990MaRDI QIDQ860351

Seungjin Han

Publication date: 9 January 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.002

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designmultiple agentsbilateral contractingmultiple principalsmenus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness ⋮ Reciprocal contracting ⋮ Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games ⋮ Sequential contracting with multiple principals ⋮ Delegation principle for multi-agency games under ex post equilibrium

Cites Work

• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
• Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
• Games Played Through Agents
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

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