Private monitoring in auctions
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Publication:860353
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.007zbMath1142.91470OpenAlexW3123642771MaRDI QIDQ860353
Publication date: 9 January 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2003/ii03-14.pdf
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Related Items (12)
Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions ⋮ Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring ⋮ Strategic experimentation with private payoffs ⋮ First-best collusion without communication ⋮ Bidder collusion at first-price auctions ⋮ Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions ⋮ Taking turns ⋮ Bribing in second-price auctions ⋮ Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions ⋮ Dynamic coordination via organizational routines
Cites Work
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- Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information
- Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
- Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.
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