Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.05.002zbMath1142.91671OpenAlexW1983991281MaRDI QIDQ860354

Matti Liski, Juan-Pablo Montero

Publication date: 9 January 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45020

zbMATH Keywords

collusionCournot competitionBertrand competitionforward markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economic growth models (91B62) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (10)

Corrigendum to ``Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly ⋮ Contracts in a procurement supply chain with intermediation: Combating collusion in price competition ⋮ Relaxing competition through speculation: committing to a negative supply slope ⋮ Increasing marginal costs are strategically beneficial in forward trading ⋮ An Optimization-Based Conjectured Response Approach to Medium-term Electricity Markets Simulation ⋮ Unintended consequences of price controls: an application to allowance markets ⋮ On the Inefficiency of Forward Markets in Leader–Follower Competition ⋮ Capacity precommitment, price competition and forward markets ⋮ Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment ⋮ Strategic bidding of offer curves: an agent-based approach to exploring supply curve equilibria

Cites Work

• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Cournot competition, forward markets and efficiency
• Softening competition through forward trading
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting

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