The price of anarchy for polynomial social cost
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Publication:861255
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2006.07.055zbMath1142.91376OpenAlexW2037822626MaRDI QIDQ861255
Martin Gairing, Marios Mavronicolas, Thomas Lücking, Burkhard Monien
Publication date: 9 January 2007
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/200/
Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Combinatorics in computer science (68R05) Games involving graphs (91A43)
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The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game ⋮ Atomic routing games on maximum congestion ⋮ Price of anarchy for parallel link networks with generalized mean objective ⋮ Tight bounds for selfish and greedy load balancing ⋮ Stability vs. optimality in selfish ring routing ⋮ Distributed backup placement in networks ⋮ A new model for selfish routing ⋮ Nash equilibria in discrete routing games with convex latency functions ⋮ Facets of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture ⋮ Unnamed Item
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