Intertemporal coordination in two-period markets

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.07.003zbMath1154.91547OpenAlexW2147298783MaRDI QIDQ861827

Sayantan Ghosal

Publication date: 2 February 2007

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumcoordinationrationalizabilitymarket gamesintertemporaleductive

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items

Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players ⋮ Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts. Concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substituabilities

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