Delegating infrastructure projects with open access

DOI10.1007/S00712-006-0198-2zbMath1133.91366OpenAlexW2142352916MaRDI QIDQ862428

Keizo Mizuno, Tetsuya Shinkai

Publication date: 24 January 2007

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://192.218.163.163/RePEc/pdf/kgdp28.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coalitiondelegationaccess chargenetwork infrastructure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers

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