A signaling model of repeated elections

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0129-8zbMath1138.91388OpenAlexW2071470949MaRDI QIDQ862541

Kenneth W. Shotts

Publication date: 24 January 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0129-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (9)

Repeated Downsian electoral competition ⋮ Pandering and electoral competition ⋮ Abstention, ideology and information acquisition ⋮ Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse ⋮ Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework ⋮ Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections ⋮ Voting with preferences over margins of victory ⋮ Pivots versus signals in elections ⋮ Majority rule when voters like to win

Cites Work

• Large Poisson games
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
• Voting as Communicating
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates

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