On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0130-2zbMath1138.91386OpenAlexW2009792793WikidataQ61586354 ScholiaQ61586354MaRDI QIDQ862542

Geoffrey Pritchard, Arkadii M. Slinko

Publication date: 24 January 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0130-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items

How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election? ⋮ Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations ⋮ Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules ⋮ Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship ⋮ Gains from manipulating social choice rules ⋮ Dichotomy for voting systems ⋮ Is it ever safe to vote strategically? ⋮ A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity ⋮ Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour

Cites Work

• The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
• Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
• The majoritarian compromise in large societies
• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On probability models in voting theory
• Probability
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