Lottery rather than waiting-line auction

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0134-yzbMath1138.91511OpenAlexW2097138921MaRDI QIDQ862544

Winston T. H. Koh, Lijing Zhu, Zhenlin Yang

Publication date: 24 January 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/204

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter

Cites Work

• The Large-Sample Behavior of Transformations to Normality
• A Survey of the Theory of Rationing

This page was built for publication: Lottery rather than waiting-line auction