A geometric study of shareholders' voting in incomplete markets: Multivariate median and mean shareholder theorems
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Publication:862548
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0138-7zbMath1138.91384OpenAlexW2056509672MaRDI QIDQ862548
Publication date: 24 January 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0138-7
Related Items (2)
Production externalities: internalization by voting ⋮ Production in incomplete markets: expectations matter for political stability
Cites Work
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