First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge
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Publication:862751
DOI10.1007/S10058-006-0003-2zbMath1124.91024OpenAlexW2026819726MaRDI QIDQ862751
Publication date: 24 January 2007
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-006-0003-2
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (4)
Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case ⋮ Procurement auctions with ex post cooperation between capacity constrained bidders ⋮ Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs ⋮ Ex anteandEx postSubcontracting between Two Competing Bidders
Cites Work
- Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
- Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
- First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
- Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
- Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence.
- Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
- Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs
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