On the existence of an increasing symmetric equilibrium in \((k+1)\)-st price common value auctions

DOI10.1007/s10058-006-0005-0zbMath1124.91027OpenAlexW2002368559MaRDI QIDQ862753

Aleksandar Saša Pekeč, Ilia Tsetlin

Publication date: 24 January 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-006-0005-0

zbMATH Keywords

Common valueAuctionsAuction theorySymmetric equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Minimax problems in mathematical programming (90C47) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Competitive Bidding with Dependent Value Estimates
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• Order Statistics
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1